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University of Virginia and NBER
More than $200 billion has been invested in Individual RetirementAc-
counts (IRAs) since their creation in 1974. By 1986,annual IRA contribu-
tions were $38 billion, and the saving incentiveenjoyed tremendous
popularity with the public. But the golden age of IRAs may havedrawn
to a close. Since the curtailment of IRA eligibilityfollowing the 1986 tax
reform, enrollment has fallen by more than 50 percent.1 Despitethe 1986
tax reform, IRAs may rise again; they remainpopular among politicians
for purposes as diverse as housing, education, andmedical expenses.
The original intent of the 1974 Employee Retirement Income Security
Act was to encourage workers without pensions to savefor their retire-
ment. The broadening of eligibility to all taxpayers,and the increased
limits on deductions in 1982, signaled a new objective for IRAs: to stimu-
late overall saving and capital formation as well as to supplementretire-
ment and pension income. How successful haveIRAs been in fulfilling
the objective of stimulating aggregate saving? In 1986,IRA deposits
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1In a preliminary study, the IRS reported that the proportion of taxpayerscontributing to
IRAs fell from 15.4 percent in 1986 to 7.2 percent in 1987. The loss in termsof dollars is
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were 29 percent of personal saving.2 If IRA contributions represent new
saving, they were partially successful at stemming the decline in per-
sonal saving during the 1980s.3 But IRAs may not represent new saving.
There are strong incentives for taxpayers to shift assets from taxable
investments, such as money market accounts, into the untaxed IRAs. At
the extreme, a taxpayer could borrow money to open an IRA and deduct
the interest payments and initial contribution. In these cases, IRAs
would not represent new saving; rather, they would allow wealthy tax-
payers to shuffle their portfolio into the tax-favored IRAs, reduce their
tax liability, and cause a substantial loss in tax revenue to the Treasury.
That is, IRAs could have reduced aggregate saving by exacerbating the
already large budget deficit with no offsetting increase in private saving.
The potential for tax arbitrage was recognized before eligibilitywas
broadened. Feldstein and Feenberg (1983) showed that few taxpayers
had sufficient taxable assets to purchase IRAs more thanone or two
years in a row; further IRA purchases would have to be financed either
by reducing current consumption or by borrowing. A number of Wash-
ington officials had little doubt how IRAs would be financed. At the 1980
House hearings on saving incentives, Donald Lubick from the Treasury
testified, "you have the..possibility of gaming the system through
borrowing and taking interest deductions and putting the borrowed
money into the tax-deferred account." (U.S. House, 1980, p. 5) During
the 1985 Senate hearings on tax reform, Daniel Halperin of Georgetown
Law School revealed the source of his IRA:
I was going to answer [Senator Bradley's] question about where money comes
from to go into IRAs. I can tell you where it comes from in my case. It comes from
borrowing.
And since you get the interest deduction on that borrowing, in effectyou get
the tax benefits without having any retirement saving at all.... (U.S. Senate,
1985; p. 91).
Financial advisors were not slow to understand the benefits of tax
arbitrage with IRAs. Columns titled "Borrow for Your IRA" and "Short
2In 1986, personal saving was $130.2 billion, while IRA contributions were $38.3 bfflion
(Economic Report of the President, 1987; SQl Bulletin, winter 1987-1988). The latter figure does
not include reinvested interest and dividends from existing IRA accounts. The fraction
approaches 70 percent of personal saving when the NIPA personal saving data are ad-
justed for inflation and for pension contributions (Summers and Carroll, 1987).
Between 1975 and 1985, personal saving declined by 2.9 percent of GNP (Summers and
Carroll, 1987). Since IRAs accounted for roughly 1 percent of GNP, they could not have
entirely offset the secular fall in saving.Sources of IRA Saving27
on Cash for an IRA? Not to Worry,Says S & L, Just Use Your Credit
Card" appeared in magazines such as Money and AmericanBanker
(Anrig, 1985; Sudo, 1985). This anecdotal evidence supportsthe view
that taxpayers used IRAs not to increase private saving but toreduce
their tax payments.
A survey of 3487 households conducted in 1984for the Investment
Company Institute sheds more light on this issue.Individuals were
asked, "Had you not put your money in an IRA during the 1983 tax year,
how would the money have been used?" As Johnson(1985) reported,
About half of the respondents said they would have saved it anyway.About 10
percent said they would have spent it all, while about 40 percentsaid they would
have spent some and saved some.
He concluded that of the $32 bfflion contributed toIRAs during 1983,
$10 billion represented new saving. Of that $10 billion,less than $7
billion represented net saving, since the government creditsIRA contri-
butions against taxable income. In short, the surveyimplies that the
government lost almost $7 billion in tax revenue (the revenueloss on the
$22 billion shifted from taxable assets into IRAs) to generate$7 billion of
net saving.4
A much different view comes from recent economicstudies of saving
and IRA purchases. Hubbard (1984) and Venti and Wise (1986,1987a,
198Th) found strong evidence from economic cross-section surveydata
that IRAs represent new saving. Supporting evidence comesfrom Car-
roll and Summers (1987), who suggest that the generousCanadian per-
sonal saving incentives are a plausible explanation for whyCanadian
saving rates have recently increased above those inthe United States.
However, given the difficulty of comparing aggregate saving ratesbe-
tween countries (Carroll and Summers) orof estimating a dynamic
model from cross-section data (Venti and Wise), the questionof whether
IRAs are tax dodges for the wealthy or a tremendouslysuccessful saving
incentive has not been resolved.
To address this question of whether IRAs contribute tocapital forma-
tion, we use the IRSUniversity of Michigan taxpayersample for income
tax returns during 1980-1984. By matching up families across afive-year
period, we can estimate the dynamic interactions of IRApurchases and
other types of saving, correct for individual differences,and test whether
We assume a marginal tax rate of 30 percent to calculate the tax lossfrom the $22 billion
in shifted assets. This loss is overstated, because it ignores the taxesthat will be paid in the
future when IRAs are redeemed (although it neglects the forgone tax revenue oninterest
accruing to the retirement account).28Feenberg & Skinner
IRA purchases are in part offset by other (net) asset sales. The "reshuf-
ffing" hypothesis implies that taxpayers who enroll in IRAs should,over
time, experience a drop in net taxable interest and dividend incomeas
their taxable assets (or new loans) are used to purchase IRAs. Conversely,
the "new saving" view of IRAs implies that taxable interest and dividend
income should be unaffected by IRA purchases.
Briefly, we find little or no evidence favoring the view that IRAsare
funded by cashing out existing taxable assets. In fact, individuals who
purchased IRAs in each year of 1982-4984 increased their asset holdings
by more than those who didn't purchase IRAs. In one sense,our results
strongly confirm the studies by Venti and Wise and by Hubbard that
IRA contributions represent new saving. But shuffling could stilloccur,
albeit on a secondary level: families who are accumulating both taxable
assets and IRAs might have accumulated even more taxable assets had
IRAs not been available.
Economic studies of why taxpayers buy IRAs typically explain contri-
butions as a function of variables such as income, wealth, and marginal
tax rates. Optimizing agents contribute to IRAs (often to the legal limit)
because of the high rate of return on their saving. Our results, however,
suggest that this view of enrollees as rational optimizers may be incom-
plete. First, taxpayers seem to have only a dim awareness of their legal
limits for IRA contributions. Of the 14 million taxpayers who contributed
to an IRA in 1985, 5.5 million taxpayers eligible to contribute between
$2250 and $4000 saved exactly $2000. Had these taxpayers contributed
up to their legal limit, they would have saved $10.5 billion more. Why
$2000? Perhaps the advertisements for IRAs common during the early
1980s conveyed not only correct information about the high rates of
return available from IRAs but also incorrect information that $2000 was
the family's maximum limit.
Our second piece of evidence that casts doubt on the traditionaleco-
nomic model is that taxpayers who owe the IRS money in excess of taxes
withheldthat is, taxpayers who must write the IRS a check on April
14_are more likely to purchase IRAs, holding constant income, wealth,
and other economic factors. This result implies that taxpayers would
prefer to write a $2000 check to their IRA account than to writean $800
check to the IRS. In this sense, IRAs encourage capital formation by
providing psychological as well as economic incentives tosave.
The beneficiaries of Individual Retirement Accounts were largely
upper-middle-class and wealthy families. In 1986, the top 9 percent of
taxpayers (with adjusted gross income in excess of $50,000) accounted
for 41 percent of IRA purchases and one-third of enrollees. While IRAsSources of IRA Saving29
may have promoted aggregate saving, theyhad little impact on the
majority of taxpayers.
1. THE TAX BENEFITS OF IRAS
The most visible benefit of IRAs is the tax deductibility of the contribu-
tion. Although the principal is taxed when it is withdrawn from the IRA,
the marginal tax rate is often low when the IRA is cashed out during
retirement. Beginning in 1987, this benefit has been curtailed for higher-
income taxpayers. For those with existing pension arrangements, the
limits on deductible contributions are gradually reduced at incomes
above $40,000 (for married couples) until they are phased out at $50,000.
Persons without qualified pension arrangements may continue to make
contributions regardless of income levels.
Another benefit of IRAs that remains available for all enrollees is the
ability to defer paying taxes on accumulated interest until the IRA is
withdrawn. Over a sufficient period of time, this second aspect can
provide a large benefit, especially if the individual pays the deferred
income tax on the interest at a lower marginal rate during retirement.
The disadvantage of IRAs is that investors must pay past taxes, as well
as a 10 percent penalty, if they withdraw fundsfrom the IRA before age
fifty-nine and a half.
Ozanne and Lindeman (1987) have calculated the tax benefits from
purchasing an IRA. Assume that the individual is initially subject to a 28
percent tax rate while working and a 15 perecent tax rate while retired.
Under the traditional rules for IRAs, which allow both contribution de-
ductibility and deferred taxation, $1000 of earnings deposited for fifteen
years at 8 percent interest would yield a net returnof $2696, which is a 62
percent gain over the $1668 return on a traditional, taxable account. If
the contribution were not deductible but interest were deferred (the
current rules for jointly filing taxpayers with income above $50,000),
then the return would be $2049, or an advantage of 23 percent. In short,
the deductibility of the contribution accounts for roughly two-thirds of
the total tax advantage of IRAs. Given the substantial financial incen-
tives for saving through IRAs, one might have expected extensive enroll-
ment across the population.5 However, as we discuss in the next section,
barely one-third of the population had opened an IRA account by early
1985.
Preliminary government estimates at the time predicted a minimal revenue loss from
IRAs, in some cases less than $1 billion. However, Feldstein and Feenberg (1983) did
predict a surge in IRA enrollment.30Feenberg & Skinner
Individual Retirement Account rules allow a surprising degree of flexi-
bility in the type of investment allowed. Taxpayers can convert stocks
and bonds into IRAs and can even place gold coins issued by the U.S.
government (or by states) in the IRA. Gold coins are an odd choice for an
IRA investment since they are lightly taxed anyway; nevertheless news-
paper advertisements during the mid-1980s touted gold IRAs quite heav-
ily. One restriction on IRA investments is that they cannot be used to
purchase collectibles such as antiques or paintings.
2. WHO PURCHASES IRAS
As a first step, it is important to explain who buys and who doesn't buy
IRAs. The traditional life-cycle theory of saving focuses on retirement
income as the primary motivation for saving. If this is so, then all fami-
lies should open an IRA, even if it is quite modest in size. The family
would enjoy a higher rate of return on saving that presumablywas
intended for retirement consumption. A more complicated life-cycle
model recognizes that families with less financial wealth may contribute
less to an IRA because liquid assets may be needed in the near future to
purchase houses or to pay for education.
We test this proposition using the IRSUniversity of Michigan panel
data set, which follows a sample of taxpayers over time (Slemrod,
1988). The sample includes taxpayers who were under age sixty-five,
who were continuously married or single, and who were in the sample
between 1979 and 1984. A total of 3991 taxpayers were included in the
sample. We construct a measure of imputed financial, taxable wealth
based on 1980-1981 interest and dividend income (averaged over two
years to reduce year-to-year fluctuations). To construct this measure of
wealth, we assume that taxpayers received an average 10 percent re-
turn on taxable interest-bearing wealth and 5 percent from stock divi-
dends (the approximate return on bonds and the dividend yield during
the period 1980-1981).
Table 1 presents the percentage of taxpayers who bought IRAs during
1982-1984, arranged by the level of imputed financial wealth. Wealth
was used in this table rather than adjusted gross income (AGI) for two
reasons. First, as we show below, financial wealth is a much better
predictor of IRA purchases than income, perhaps because many taxpay-
ers with high gross incomes report very low AGIs. Second, taxpayers
with low wealth are less likely to purchase IRAs (holding income con-
stant), because IRAs are illiquid or because of borrowing constraints.
The third column of Table 1 shows that more than 86 percent of
taxpayers with financial wealth less than $2000 did not buy an IRASources of IRA Saving31
TABLE 1
Percentage Distribution of Taxpayers by Years of IRA Enrollment and
Asset Income, 1982-1984
Notes: Percentages may not sum to 100, owing to rounding error. The individual is considered to be
enrolled if a positive contribution is made for that year.
Source: Michigan/IRS Panel Data
during the years 1982-1984. A small fraction, 4 percent, purchased IRAs
in all three years. The fraction of taxpayers purchasing IRAs increases
steadily with wealth; nearly half of those with financial wealth in excess
of $50,000 purchased an IRA during all three years. But one-third of this
very wealthy group did not purchase an IRA in anyof the three years, a
finding that is clearly inconsistent with the traditional life-cycle model,
in which families might be expected to devote at least a fraction of their
wealth to retirement.
A statistical answer to the question of who buys IRAs can be gained
from regression analysis, in which we estimate IRA dollar purchases as a
function of various exogenous factors, such as AGI, asset income, tax
rates, cash owed to the IRS, and demographics.6 Regression results from
ordinary least-squares are presented in Table 2 but summarized below.
Adjusted gross income, while significant, does not have a great deal of
power in explaining IRA purchases when wealth isheld constant. For
example, families with an AGI of $50,000 are predicted to purchase only
$352 more in IRAs than families with an AGI of $5,000. Yet an increase in
the level of wealth from less than $1000 to $10,000 (holding AGI con-
stant) is predicted to increase IRA holdings by $746. The finding that
families with higher assets purchase more IRAs is evidence in favor of a
"portfolio" model; individuals contribute to IRAs if there are other more
liquid assets available. This finding is also consistent with Venti and
Wise (1987a), who found that IRA enrollees had higher levels of median
wealth (holding income and age constant).
6One shortcoming of our data set is that we do not have the age of the taxpayer. Venti and






Years of IRA participation
0 1 2 3
<2000 2438 86.6 5.8 3.5 4.0
2000-10,000 727 49.5 15.8 12.4 22.1
10,000-50,000 595 38.5 10.1 12.2 39.0
> 50,000 231 31.2 6.7 13.4 48.5
Total 3991 68.9 8.3 7.1 15.632Feenberg & Skinner
R2= 403
We have calculated the (net-of-IRA) marginal tax rate for each tax-
payer. The out-of-pocket "price" per dollar of IRA contribution is one
minus this tax rate. The price variable is significant and negative; it
implies that a decline in the marginal tax rate from, say, 40 percent to 28
percent would reduce IRA purchases by $398, holding both wealth and
AGI constant.7 The strong impact of the tax rate on IRA purchases sug-
Because the marginal tax variable is an almost exact function of taxable Ad, the tax
variable may proxy for nonlinear effects of AGI (beyond the quadratic expansion in Table










Coeff. T-stat. Coeff. T-stat.
Joint filing 257.8 5.87 947.1 3.47
Net Aftertax price of IRAs -3314.9 16.49 -5560.2 5.70
Dependents -95.8 6.41 -676.5 7.51
Log (virtual income) -3306.7 6.32 -6570.8 1.78
Log (virtual income)
squared 178.9 6.80 483.3 2.71
Capital gains?
(one if yes) 21.1 0.43 487.5 2.00
Assets:
1000-2500 81.7 1.58 588.3 1.71
Assets:
2500-5000 134.2 2.31 720.6 2.02
Assets:
5000-10,000 276.2 4.67 1557.7 4.38
Assets:
10,000-25,000 745.9 13.48 2750.4 8.12
Assets:
25,000-50,000 928.3 13.22 3120.9 8.05
Assets:
50,000+ 792.6 11.04 2350.1 6.10
Owe cash to IRS?
(one if yes) 183.6 3.18 820.3 2.10
Owe Cash x whether
asset mc> $250 334.3 4.44 1600.3 3.50
Constant 18068.3 6.77 23736.3 0.85Sources of IRA Saving33
gests that IRA enrollments would havedeclined in 1987 even if the
eligibility rules had not been tightened.
A variable measuring whether the taxpayer owed money tothe IRS (in
addition to income already withheld) was alsointroduced, along with an
interactive variable reflecting whether interest anddividend income was
in excess of $250. These two variables weredesigned to test the hypothe-
sis that taxpayers are more likely to contribute to anIRA when they owe
money to the IRS (perhaps becauseof the psychological cost of writing a
check to the IRS!). If only economic factors are important,these two
variables should not affect IRA purchases. However, wefind that the
representative taxpayer will contribute an average of$184 (with low
asset income) or $518 (with asset income above$250) more to an IRA if
he or she owes money to the IRS at the end of the taxyear.8
There are a number of alternative explanations for thisfinding. One is
that taxpayers do not generally pay withholding taxes oncapital income.
Those with high levels of wealth would both owe extra taxes onApril 14
and enroll in IRAs. However, the statisticalanalysis has already con-
trolled for the wealth level; the regression implies thatbetween two
taxpayers with identical wealth, the one who owes moneyto the IRS will
be more likely to purchase an IRA. Another explanationfor our finding
is that aggressive tax planners both regularlyunderwithhold tax pay-
ments and buy IRAs. If this is the case, then aspurious (positive) correla-
tion between underwithholding and IRApurchases should be found,
although we find it unlikely that fine-tuned tax planningcould account
for such large differences in average IRA purchases.
One problem with the least-squares regression isthat it cannot ac-
count for the bunching of taxpayers either at zero(for those who pur-
chase no IRAs) or at $2000 (for those who contribute up totheir putative
legal limit). Because of this bunching, least-squaresregression results
wifi generally understate the true impact of the explanatoryvariables on
IRA contributions. The two-limit Tobit estimationmethod corrects for
this problem; these regression results are alsopresented in Table 2. In
general, the results are consistent with the ordinary least-squares regres-
sions, but the coefficients are larger (and the t-statisticssmaller). For
example, the two-limit Tobit regression implies thatdesired IRA pur-
chases will rise by $667 (rather than $398) as aresult of a decline in tax
rates from .40 to .28.
In summary, this section has shown that IRApurchases are highly
correlated with asset wealth and that the marginal tax rateand the cash
The variable that determines whether the individual owes cash tothe IRS is based on a
calculation of what taxes would have been owed had the IRA not beenpurchased; if this
amount exceeded taxes withheld, then the dummy variable waspositive.34Feenberg & Skinner
position of the taxpayer have a strong impact on IRA purchases. These
latter two effects support the notion that the cash value of deductingan
IRA (the size of the IRA times the marginal tax rate)may loom large in
the mind of the taxpayer who owes money to the IRS. It is interestingto
note that the regression results contradict the "liquidity constraint" view
of saving. Taxpayers flush with tax refunds are less likely toopen an IRA
than taxpayers who owe money to the IRS.
Finally, we present evidence that suggests some level of ignorance
about the true legal limits on IRA contributions. The lawstates that
allowable maximum contributions for single taxpayersare $2000; for
couples with one spouse working, $2250 ($2000 in the workingspouse's
account, and $250 in the nonworking spouse's account); and for couples
with both spouses working, $4000. Yet a very large fraction of these
latter two groups contributed exactly $2000. While these familiesmight
not have chosen to contribute the full $4000 (or $2250), itseems unlikely
that they would have chosen exactly $2000 unless they(wrongly)
thought themselves constrained to that point. To estimate themagni-
tude of false constraints, we use the NBER Taxsim modelto estimate
both the number of taxpayers who were thus constrained, and thein-
creased contributions that would have occurred had those individuals
chosen to contribute their legal maximum. The breakdownis presented
in Table 3 by imputed wealth level. We estimate that in 1985,5.5 million
taxpayers (of the total 14 million who contributed)were falsely con-
strained at $2000. Had they contributed the legal maximum, theywould
have increased IRA saving by $10.5 billion, with the largest increasein
contributions by those with AGIs between $30,000 and $70,000.
There are alternative explanations for the $2000-limit contribution that
do not rely on ignorance. First, itmay not be worth the trouble to open
up a new account for the spouse if his or her legal limit is only $250. But
in total, the forgone $250 contributions account for only $2 billion ofthe
$10.5 billion in potential IRA enrollments. Another potential explanation
is "marital distrust"; taxpayers do not openan IRA account in their
spouse's name but only in their own. We feel that the most compelling
explanation for the false $2000 limits is that the advertisementsand
brochures for IRAs common during the early 1980s made botha positive
impression on consumers (encouraging them to buy IRAs) anda nega-
tive impression (that $2000 was the legal limit).
That taxpayers are more likely to contribute to an IRA when theyowe money to the IRS is
not necessarily evidence that the contributions are new saving rather than reshuffled
saving. It is not clear, however, that any psychological incentive would benecessary to
induce taxpayers to reshuffle, given the low transaction costs involved in shiftingtaxable
assets into IRAs.TABLE 3
Falsely Constrained IRA Contributors, 1985
Sources of IRA Saving35
Notes: Taxpayers who are "falsely constrained" contributed exactly $2000 but wereeligible to contribute
more than $2000. Additional feasible contributions are theadditional IRA contributions that legally
could have been made by the falsely constrained taxpayers. Unconstrained taxpayers are neitherfalsely
constrained nor legally constrained.
Sources: IRS Public Use Sample and NBER Taxsim model.
3. DO IRAS REPRESENT NEW SAVING?
In this section, we address the primary question ofthis paper: Do IRAs
represent new saving, or are they "old" saving (or newloans) reshuffled
into IRAs to minimize taxes? Simple economic theory suggeststhat while
IRAs offer a higher rate of return on savings below thecontribution limit,
they offer no incentive for saving above that amount.Individuals who
regularly save above their IRA limit have no incentive to save more,since
they face the same aftertax marginal rate. In this view,IRAs can target
only a limited group of peoplesmall savers who had previouslyplanned
to save less than their contribution limit fortheir retirement. i°
Venti and Wise (1986, 1987a, 198Th) suggest a richermodel of sving,
in which IRA saving and non-IRA saving may be imperfectsubstitutes in
the consumer's portfolio. To the extent that IRA savingsubstitutes for
non-IRA saving (leaving total saving unaffected), reshuffling occurs.
Venti and Wise develop a sophisticated econometric techniquewhich
suggests that IRAs are drawn primarily from consumptionrather than




























394 1188 1765 63 340936Feenberg & Skinner
from other, taxable, forms of saving. They must impose strongassump-
tions, however, to disentangle the effect of individual characteristics
(that is, people who have a high propensity to save may be more likely to
buy IRAs) from the structural parameters they want to estimate, using
data from only a single year (Deaton, 1987).
Carroll and Summers (1987) note that the saving rates in the United
States and Canada, after tracking one another closely for a number of
years, diverged substantially in the mid-1970s; by 1982, the U.S. private
saving rate had dropped to 5.5 percent, while the Canadian rate had
risen to 10.6 percent. Carroll and Summers suggest that the broad eligi-
bility and higher limits for retirement-saving plans in Canada could
account in part for the higher Canadian saving rate. While the Canadian
retirement-saving accounts may have stimulated saving (Canadians
have contributed more than 20 percent of personal saving inevery year
since 1976), by the early 1980s they could account, at best, for onlyone-
quarter of the divergence in personal saving rates.
Our test of whether WAs are net saving is to compare the taxable
interest and dividend income of IRA enrollees with the equivalent in-
come of nonenrollees. In the reshuffling hypothesis, taxable assets are
converted into IRAs, so one would expect taxable asset income in 1984
relative to 1980-1981 (before WAs were commonly used) to be less for
IRA enrollees. The new-saving hypothesis implies that IRA contribu-
tions are made at the expense of consumption rather than existingsav-
ing. Because we compare changes in asset income between 1980-1981
and 1984 for those buying and those not buying IRAs, we correct for
changes in interest and dividend income during the four-year period.
The magnitude of changes in dividend and interest income is large
when the reshuffling hypothesis is held true. Consider a taxpayer ata 30
percent tax rate who shifts $2000 at the outset of each year from a money
market account (which pays the three-month Treasury rate) into an IRA.
By 1984, the decline in taxable interest income caused by the IRA contri-
butions would have been $614, which is 30 percent of average taxable
dividend and interest income during 1984. The decline would be less
pronounced if the hypothetical taxpayer contributed to the IRA account
at the end of the tax year rather than the beginning.
Table 4 describes taxable interest and dividend income in 1980-1981
and 1984, for different levels of financial wealth in 1980-1981, and for the
number of years during 1982-1984 that the taxpayer purchased an IRA.
The top number in each category is average interest and dividend in-
come in 1980-1981; the bottom is for 1984. There is an overall growth in
interest and dividend income for all groups, which is consistent with the
secular increase reported in the IRS aggregate statistics. The strikingSources of IRA Saving37
TABLE 4:
Interest and Dividend Income in 1980-1981 and 1984,
by Years of Participation
Note: The top number is average interest and dividend income in 1980-1981. The bottom number is
average interest and dividend income in 1984.
Source: IRS-Michigan Panel Data
result is that taxable asset income rises by more for those who purchased
IRAs. This result is shown graphically in Figure 1. The bar graph de-
scribes the change in interest and dividend income for two groups: those
who purchased no IRAs and those who purchased IRAs in all three
years. For all levels of initial asset wealth, the increase in asset income is
greater for those who purchased IRAs than for those who did not.
Taxable asset accumulation is positively correlated with the number of
IRA enrollment years for all but the group with more than$50,000in
wealth. In Table4,for the lowest level of wealth, those who did not
purchase any IRAs experienced a growth in interest and dividend in-
come of$101 ($146-$25);for those buying an IRA in one year, asset
income grew by$363;in two years,$632;and in three years,$848.
Similar results are realized for all asset classes except for the wealthiest.
Not only do these results reject the reshuffling hypothesis, but they go
beyond the new-saving argument to imply that IRAs "crowd in" taxable
saving.
A proponent of the reshufifing hypothesis might reply to the evidence
in Table4by observing that taxpayers could be financing their IRA
purchases with loans, so that asset income would be unaffected by IRA
purchases. To test this proposition, we compare tax-deductible interest
payments, excluding mortgage interest, for IRA enrollees and non-
Taxable wealth
1980-1981
Years of IRA participation
0 1 2 3
<$2000 25 56 53 65
146 419 685 913
$2000-10,000 370 373 343 433
836 944 1546 1682
$10,000-50,000 1637 1837 1597 1819
2432 3483 2906 3620
> $50,000 11,785 7356 7764 11,868




















No IRAs Purchased IRAs Purchased
FIGURE 1. Change in Taxable Interest and Dividend Income: 1980-
1981 and 1984
enrollees.11 These comparisons are presented in Table 5, and are also
shown in Figure 2. Note that the calculations are limited to taxpayers
who itemize. Like the comparisons of interest and dividend income,
Figure 2 shows the change in tax-deductible interest payments for two
groups; those who purchased no IRAs and those who purchased IRAs in
each of the three years of 1982-1984. For those with wealth less than
$2000, interest payments increased by $251 for nonenrollees and by $522
for enrollees. The difference in interest payments, $271, could account
for almost two years of IRA purchases.12 The ordering holds as well for
11We exclude housing mortgage payments because we deem it unlikely that an individual
would refinance his or her house to purchase IRAs (although see Manchester and Poterba,
1989). Including housing interest payments tends.to cloud the positive correlation between
IRA purchases and interest payments.
12 Assume the taxpayer purchased $4000 worth of IRAs. In a 30-percent tax bracket, the
net outlay would have been $2800; at a 12-percent interest charge, the interest deduction
on the full $2800 would have been $336.TABLE 5
Deductible Nonmortgage Interest Payments in 1980-1981 and 1984, by
Years of Participation
Sources of IRA Saving39
Note: The top number is deductible interest payments, averaged over 1980-1981. The bottom number is
deductible interest payments in 1984. The sample includes only those who itemized.
taxpayers with a greater amount of asset income. While the relatively
greater increase in borrowing for IRA enrollees may suggest some asset
shifting, it is stifi the case that the increase in net asset incomegross
dividend and interest income less interest paymentsis substantially
larger for IRA enrollees than for those who do not purchase IRAs.
Feldstein and Feenberg (1983) observe that if the reshuffling argument
were correct, many taxpayers would be unable to purchase IRAs for
more than a few years before their liquid assets would be depleted. If
taxpayers with less asset income (and presumably lower AGI) were un-
able to sustain IRA purchases for more than a few years, then IRAs
should, over time, become concentrated among high-income individu-
als. We test this proposition with data from the IRS Statistics of income for
1982 and preliminary reports for 1986 (501 Bulletin, Winter 1987-1988). A
breakdown of IRA purchases by AGI for two years, 1982 and 1986, is
presented in Figure 3. Along the horizontal axis are the percentiles of
taxpayers, ranked by adjusted gross income. Along the vertical axis are
cumulative percentiles of IRA purchases, relative to total IRA contribu-
tions. For example, the chart shows that in 1982, the bottom half of
taxpayers (aligned by AGI) accounted for 8 percent of total IRA pur-
chases. A comparison of the distribution for 1982 (open circles) and 1986
(dark circles) reveals that they are virtually identical. There is no evi-
dence, then, that the distribution of IRA purchases by AGI has changed
at all between 1982 and 1986. The same fraction of lower-income families
Taxable wealth
1980-1981
Years of IRA participation
0 1 2 3
<$2000 313 670 619 828
564 1136 1180 1350
$2000-10,000 559 588 571 677
718 1027 1265 1106
$10,000-50,000 378 565 443 475
725 820 765 887
> $50,000 1778 671 1323 1002
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FIGURE 2. Change in Interest Deductions between 1980-1981 and 1984
continue to buy IRAs, even after four years of eligibility. This finding
casts doubt on the proposition that taxpayers shifted taxable assets into
IRAs during the early 1980s.
Evidence about the dynamic pattern of IRA purchases provides fur-
ther evidence against the view that IRA enrollees "run out of steam." In
fact, we find the opposite effect; once enrolled, taxpayers are unlikely to
drop out. Table 6 presents the time pattern of IRA purchases, once again
separated by interest and dividend income during 1980-1981. The code
in the first column details which years (if any) an IRA was purchased
during 1982-1984, where a 1 represents IRA enrollment. For example,
the number of taxpayers with initial wealth levels less than $2000 who
purchased no IRA in 1982 but subsequently purchased IRAs in 1983 and
1984 (corresponding to code 011) was fifty-seven.
The hypothesis that families with low levels of asset income shift their
existing assets into IRAs for the first one or two years gains little support
in this table. There were 161 taxpayers with financial wealth less than
$2000 who purchased an IRA in 1982. Of that group, 71 percent boughtTABLE 6
Do Contributors Run Out of Steam?
Sources of IRA Saving41
Note: Three-digit code presents a summary of whether the individual purchased an IRA in 1982-1983-
1984. One represents an IRA purchase, 0 represents no IRA purchase.
Source: IRS/Michigan Panel Data
IRAs in the following year, and 66 percent bought IRAs in 1984. Similarly,
five out of six enrollees who contributed to an IRA in 1983 also did so in
1984. Finally, 80 percent of those who bought an IRA in both 1982 and
1983 purchased an IRA in 1984. If the reshuffling story were correct, most,
if not all, assets of this latter group would have been exhausted by 1984.
What causes taxpayers to drop out of IRAs? Additional evidence sug-
gests that they drop out because of a substantial jolt to earnings. Con-
sider the sample of taxpayers who purchased an IRA in 1982. Nominal
earnings rose by 4 percent for those who continued to purchase an IRA
in 1983 but fell by 13 percent for those who did not. A similar story held
for IRA enrollees in 1983; earnings rose by 8 percent among those contrib-
uting to an IRA in 1984, but fell by 10 percent for those who dropped
out.13 In summary, there is some evidence of habit or persistence; once
the IRA account is opened, enrollees contribute unless their financial
health is shaken.
The results described above imply that IRA purchases are positively
correlated with saving in taxable assets. There are three potential expla-
nations for this result. The first is that some people save and others are
spendthrifts. Savers will buy IRAs and other taxable assets, while spend-
thrifts will avoid IRAs and other forms of saving. The problem with this
explanation is that the positive correlation between IRA saving and
13The decline in earnings could also reflect early retirement. Either case is evidence
against the shifting hypothesis.
IRA
pattern





50,000 > 50,000 Total
000 2085 351 229 88 2753
001 87 57 30 9 183
010 17 23 14 5 59
011 57 54 38 21 170
100 37 32 16 5 90
101 9 14 10 4 37
110 18 20 25 13 76
111 97 157 232 137 623
Total 2407 708 594 282 399142Feenberg & Skinner
other types of saving holds across all levels of wealth. Holding constant
financial wealth (which reflects the taste for saving), those who purchase
IRAs also save more. Another problem with the explanation is that there
is very little correlation between saving behavior during the years 1979-
1981 and 1982-1984. One cannot characterize individuals as savers or
spendthrifts, because their taste for saving seems to vary over time.
A second explanation allows for a more subtle model of reshuffling to
explain IRA purchases. The evidence suggests strongly that whatever
the initial level of assets, changes in saving behavior over time are associ-
ated with both IRA purchases and saving in taxable instruments. That is,
families arrive at a particular point in their life cycle when they choose to
accumulate for their retirement or other goal. Part of their saving is
allocated to the IRA and part to other sources. For example, assume that
a family chooses to save $15,000 over a three-year period. In the absence
of IRAs, all of the $15,000 would be deposited in money markets and
stocks. If IRAs are available, $6,000 of the $15,000 would be deposited in
IRAs, with $9000 deposited in taxable assets.14 A cross-section compari-
son of this family with other families would find that IRA purchasers
save more in taxable assets than those without IRAs; that is, the simple
reshufffing hypothesis would be rejected. Yet, by construction, the IRA
saving does not represent new saving, since it would have been saved in
the taxable asset anyway. Such a model can potentially reconcile the
survey results in Johnson (1985) with evidence from Venti and Wise.
The difference between the subtle version of reshuffling and the sim-
ple version is one of magnitude. The new view of reshuffling implies
that only those taxpayers who are actively saving will shift assets (and
perhaps those only partially). In the simple reshufffing hypothesis, ev-
ery investor finds it profitable to shelter assets in IRAs.
The third explanation for why IRA saving appears to "crowd in" tax-
able saving comes from Katona (1964). He conducted a pioneering study
of how pensions affect private saving, to answer much the same ques-
tion we are addressing: Do pensions crowd out private retirement sav-
ing? His results are similar to ours; those with pensions saved more in
nonpension saving than those without pensions, considering factors
such as income.15 Katona's explanation for the positive correlation be-
tween pension saving and nonpension saving is that
14 We ignore the reduction in tax liabffity caused by IRA contributions.
'Katona avoids one problem that we face in our study. As he points out, he does not have
to worry about people with strong tastes for saving choosing pensions (as we must worry
about "savers" enroffing in WAs). The reason is that pensions are provided for all employ-
ees, not just those who like to save. He tests for whether employees with a taste for saving
choose employers with pensions plans but finds no evidence in favor of such selection.Sources of IRA Saving43
..the provision of adequate funds during old age no longer appears an
insurmountably difficult problem: being closer to the goal stimulates people to
work harder to achieve the goal, and therefore collective retirement plans promote
individual saving. (p. 5)
That is, individuals view pension plans as bringing them within reach
of a comfortable retirement, so it becomes worthwhile to save the extra
amount (in nonpension saving) to attain their goal. Both the subtle
reshufifing explanation, and Katona's "goal-attainment" explanation (a
stronger form of the new-saving hypothesis), are consistent with the
data, but at this stage, we cannot distinguish between the two. We can
decisively rule out the simple reshuffling view of IRAs.
Thus far, we have focused only on the incentive aspects of IRAs. One
of the primary criticisms of IRA enrollment was the extent to which the
tax subsidy benefited high-income taxpayers. As Figure 3 shows, those
with AGIs above $50,000 (9 percent of all taxpayers) accounted for 41
percent of all IRA purchases (and one-third of enrollees). One response
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FIGURE 3: IRA Distribution, 1982 and 1986 (by AGI)44Feenberg & Skinner
in the market for any type of retirement saving. A better measure of the
progressivity of IRAs comes from a comparison of the progressivity of
interest and dividend income relative to the progressivity of IRA pur-
chases for taxpayers under age sixty-five. One might expect that IRA
purchases would be more progressive, because wealthy families are pre-
vented from contributing more than $2000 per taxpayer. To test this
hypothesis, we show the cumulative distribution of interest and divi-
dend income and IRAs during 1985 for taxpayers under the age of sixty-
five in Figure 4. Once again, the horizontal axis shows the cumulative
distribution of taxpayers on the basis of AGI, while the vertical axis
shows the cumulative distribution of interest and dividend income, and
IRA. contributions, during 1985. IRA contributions are less progressive
than overall asset income for 85 percent of the taxpayers (income less
than $40,000 in 1985). The results shown here suggest that a generalized
saving incentive for all interest and dividend income (along the lines of
lower marginal rates on nonwage income) might have provided a more
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4. CONCLUSION
The period of1982-1986may be remembered as the years of the IRA
saving-incentive experiment. Whether the IRA experiment represented
a massive subsidy provided to wealthy taxpayerswith no increase in
net savingor whether it represented a successful and popular tax incen-
tive is still open to debate. This paper has presented evidence support-
ing the view that IRA saving represents new saving. If there is tax
reshufifing, it occurs only marginally, through increased borrowing, or
through a more subtle form of reshuffling; individuals who are buying
IRAs would have increased their taxable saving by even more had the
IRAs not been available.
We have also provided evidence that even those taxpayers who did
enroll in IRAs did not take full advantage of its provisions. More than
one-third of all IRA contributors in1985contributed exactly$2000when
they were eligible to contribute more. While they could have been acting
rationally for reasons unclear to us, we suggest that a lack of public
information about the size of IRA limits led to underutilization of IRAs.
Finally, we have shown that IRAs were not particularly progressive;
for income levels less than $40,000, a generalized saving incentive for
interest and dividend income might have been more equitable than the
existing IRA system. However, it is not clear that a general saving-
incentive system would have been as successful as an IRA in encourag-
ing new saving. Our results suggest that taxpayers need the immediate
gratification of a tax deduction to nudge them towards adequate retire-
ment saving.
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